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Early Banking in New Mexico from
the Civil War to the Roaring Twenties
LARRY SCHWElKART

The rider furiously lashed the horse on, but the animal dragged, laden
as it was with gold in both saddlebags. When the rider made it to the
Mississippi River he would have two choices: board the next boat to
New Orleans, and from there to England, or cross into Arkansas, Texas,
and press on to the frontier. In this case he rested his tired mount
while waiting for a trip south. When it was again safe, he would return
with the gold. It, after all, represented the entire remaining capitalization of the Bank of Northern Tennessee, and the rider-its president,
David Kennedy-would not abandon the business he had built just
because the Yankees neared. 1
Although many Southern bankers returned to their banks to try
to restore their businesses after the war, many simply moved west.
And although the exciting exploits of Kennedy seem to contradict the
Larry Schweikart is assistant professor of history in the University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio. He is author of several books and articles on frontier banking. This essay is
a result of research for a forthcoming book, Banking in the American West from the Gold
Rush to Deregulation. The author wishes to thank the University of Dayton and the Charles
Redd Center for Western Studies and George Noland of the University of Dayton Research Institute for financial support of this research.
1. David Kennedy's story and similar adventures are found in Larry Schweikart,
"Banking in the American South, 1836-1865" (doctoral dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1983), 661-64, 675-82.
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image of banking as dull, lifeless, and impersonal, frontier finance had
its share of drama even aside from the rare times when a seedy-looking
stranger in a mask pointed his pistol across the counter at a terrified
teller, demanding the contents of the vault. New Mexico was no different, featuring institutional jealousies, corporate boardroom struggles, and economic panics. While New Mexico banking has been the
subject of numerous short studies, none have reached into the wealth
of manuscript materials to look at the state's banking from the inside.
Little disagreement exists about the founding of New Mexico's
first real financial institution, the First National Bank of Santa Fe, founded
by Lucien B. Maxwell in 1870. Maxwell invested $150,000-the bank's
entire capitalization-out of proceeds from his sale of the "Maxwell
Grant" property, specifically the Beaubien and Miranda grants. The
southern part of the territory had, nevertheless, been located in the
market area of Lord and Williams, a private Tucson, Arizona, banking
firm, since that mercantile firm opened in 1866. A federal depository
as of 1869, it often held more than a million dollars in its vault. But
the presence of Lord and Williams, in addition to EI Paso private banking firms, did little to service the large population of the northern half
of the territory, where Albuquerque, Santa Fe, and Las Vegas were
located. 2
New Mexico was no different from Arkansas, Texas, and the developing Midwest in its need for a circulating medium in the 1860s.
Indeed, much of the Great Plains area as far west as the Rockies used
fur pelts as money until the Civil War. This dearth of money encouraged
a group of prominent citizens, including Sigmund Seligman, Ceran St.
Vrain, and Levi Speigelberg, to obtain a provisional charter for a bank
from the territorial legislature in 1863. The proposed Bank of New
Mexico, to be located in Santa Fe, was a property bank that featured
certain free-banking principles in its charter. When the president and
2. New Mexico's banking history is traced in Paul A. F. Walter, "New Mexico's
Pioneer Bank and Bankers," New Mexico Historical Review, 21 (July 1946), 209-25; Ralph
Edge!, A Brief History of Banking in New Mexico, 1870-1959 [Bureau of Business Research
Series, no. 39] (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1962), 1-26; History of New
Mexico: Its Resources and Its People (2 vols., Los Angeles: Pacific States Publishing Co.,
1907), 1: 412-35. Material on Lord and Williams is located in Larry Schweikart, A History
of Banking in Arizona (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1982), 9, 36, 119; and Larry
Schweikart, '''You Count It': The Birth of Banking in Arizona," Journal of Arizona History,
22 (Autumn 1981), 349-68. The presence of Lord and Williams, a banking house in all
but the official name, refutes the contention that the First National Bank of Santa Fe was
the "oldest bank in the entire Southwestern United States," Wayne L. Mauzy, A Century
in Santa Fe: The Story of the First National Bank of Santa Fe (Santa Fe: Vergara Printing Co.,
1970), 10.
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directors had "present[ed] ... real estate or landed property" or when
they had deposited with the auditor either its own stock or United
States 6 percent bonds, the governor would issue a charter. Thus, even
though the law provided for the creation of a specific bank, it contained
general principles of property banking (which said that property constituted sufficient capital assets with which to back note issues), and
of free banking (whereby bonds deposited with a government agency
were sufficient to back note issues) that would have established precedent for future banks. Had national legislation not intervened, New
Mexico's legislature in all likelihood would have moved toward freebanking laws. In this respect, New Mexico appears to have been in
the group of states tending toward progressive banking regulation. 3
Before the Bank of New Mexico could be organized, however, the
U.S. Congress enacted several banking and currency laws, including
the National Bank Act and the National Currency Act, which destroyed
the antebellum system of banks of issue. After passage of these acts,
any bank that issued its own notes would find them taxed at a 10
percent rate. As a result, the American monetary system was nationalized overnight. In many ways, so was the banking system: Congress
had to approve new charters in the territories before they could be
granted but ignored the petition for the Bank of New Mexico's charter.
The New Mexico institution was never born. 4
On September 3, 1870, however, Lucien Maxwell, John Watts,
Charles Holly, Peter Maxwell, and Henry Hooper executed the articles
of incorporation for the First National Bank. None of the officersMaxwell as president, Watts as vice-president, and Hooper as cashierreceived any pay, and the stockholders did not meet again until eight
3. Ralph Emerson Twitchell, Leading Facts of New Mexican History (5 vols., Cedar
Rapids, Iowa: The Torch Press, 1917), 5: 259; Edge!. Brief History, 4-5. For common
complaints about money shortages in the antebellum South, see Larry Schweikart, Banking in the American South from the Age of Jackson to Reconstruction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1987). The' use of pelts as money is discussed in Lewis E. Davids,
'''Fur' Money and Banking in the West." Journal of the West, 23 (April 1984), 7-10. A
review of free-banking laws appears in Hugh Rockoff, The Free Banking Era: A Re-examination (New York: Arno Press, 1975), and a revisionist approach is found in Arthur
Rolnick and Warren Weber, "Inherent Instability in Banking: The Free Banking Experience," CATO Journal, 5 (Winter 1986), 877-90, and in Lawrence White, "Regulatory
Sources of Instability in Banking," CATO Journal, 5 (Winter 1986), 891-97. Neither the
concept of a mortgage bank nor that of free banking was new, as is suggested in Paul
A. F. Walter, Banking in New Mexico Before the Railroad Came! (New York: Newcomen
Society, 1955), 9.
4. Sidney Ratner, James H. Soltow, and Richard Sylla, The Evolution of the American
Economy: Growth~ Welfare and Decision Making (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 344-51.
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An original stock certificate of the First National Bank of Santa Fe, issued in 1870, included the
likeness of Lucien B. Maxwell, the bank's founder. Photo courtesy of Banquest/First National Bank
of Santa Fe.
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months later to sell control of the bank to Thomas Catron and Stephen
Elkins, the bank's legal counsel. Both Elkins and Catron were associated
with the Maxwell Land Grant, with Elkins acting as president of the
Maxwell Land Grant and Railway Company. (He mortgaged the deed
to this company for $3.5 million.) Immediately the bank's officers sought
to have the bank designated the U.S. depository. By February 1871 the
first currency had arrived, escorted by twenty-five soldiers, and in April
the bank, after considering opening an office in El Palacio, rented a
storeroom in the Don Fernando Delgado Building in Santa Fe. On April
18, 1871, it opened for business. s
During the initial weeks of operations Elkins and Catron, who
were not on the original board of directors, feigned the creation of a
competitor-their own national bank. For the first time since organization, the stockholders of First National called for a meeting, but no
quorum could be effected until May 10, and only on May 17 did Maxwell
act, surrendering control of the bank to Elkins, Catron, and their "Santa
Fe gang." Elkins emerged with the majority of the shares; both he and
Catron were on the new board, and Elkins was the new president. The
bank's June statement showed deposits of more than $22,000 and loans
of over $33,000. 6
This history is fairly well known, repeated by several historians.
However, the period after First National's reorganization has not been
as clear. A competitor, the Second National Bank of New Mexico, was
being organized in April 1872, also in Santa Fe, when the First National
group learned of it. Elkins and his associates, probably due to First
National's difficulty in attracting deposits, became alarmed. To Northrup and Chick, the bank's New York brokers, Elkins reported, "Some
jews of this place together with one of the Speigelbergs of New York
are attempting ... to establish a 29 Nat. Bank her"e. Of course it is to
our interest to defeat their project if possible." Elkins contacted the
Comptroller of the Currency, who oversaw the chartering of all national
banks, suggesting that creation of a second bank in Santa Fe would
"render the success of both quite doubtful." However, Elkins did not
count on his own abilities alone, requesting his New York friends to
"take immediate steps in our behalf." After Second National opened,
Elkins, partly out of pride and partly out of concern, in September
wrote to a customer of the bank's "desire to accommodate and retain
all our present patronage if possible; and although the new bank has
5. Walter, "New Mexico's Pioneer Bank," 216-17, 219-21.
6. Ibid., 221-22.
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been in operation some time we have not yet lost a single account or a
dollar of deposits. "7
The Second National Bank, chartered on July 17, 1872, capitalized
at $150,000, and, run by the Speigelberg brothers (Solomon, Levi, Willi,
and Lehman), had New York connections to Levi's banking house
there. The brothers had operated a successful mercantile operation in
Santa Fe for twenty years before they applied for their bank charter.
Among the allies they enlisted, Jose Felipe Chavez, a merchant trader,
Democrat, and owner of the first steam-driven flour mill in New Mexico, was soon named as a director. Willi Speigelberg informed him of
his reappointment to the board in 1879, because of "your great wealth
and great financial abilities as well as your universally known reputation." The bank obviously had local support. Of the stockholders
listed in 1880, thirteen of twenty-three were from New Mexico, and
seven of those were from Santa Fe.
Still, as of 1872, and despite Elkins' concern, the new bank had
its troubles. In August, Lehman Speigelberg, the president of Second
National, requested that the Comptroller of the Currency ship its current installment of currency to a New York bank to the order of Willi
Speigelberg (cashier of Second National) to avoid the charges of the
stagecoach companies, which Speigelberg characterized as "extravagant outlay" and "more than a young Bank ... could stand."The bank
requested, a week later, that Levi Speigelberg, through his banking
house in New York, furnish "a list of banking houses through which
we may correspond," relying on the New Yorker to select banks in
Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, and Cincinnati. Levi Speigelberg responded, offering banking advice and asking about the chances of
Lehman's bank. The Santa Fe banker assured the New Yorker that "our
chances of getting plenty of business are good," citing a number of
friends and customers who "do not desire to do business elsewhere if
they can possibly help it." He reported that private parties had begun
discount business, and that the bank planned to get "a great deal of
this ... in time." Predicting $50,000 in deposits by the end of the year,
Lehman noted, "Diamond hunters and Strangers of every description
are coming in every day, and the Banking business ought to be good
at once." Indeed, business did improve, and Second National became
a viable competitor. 8
7. Stephen Elkins to Northrup and Chick, April 29, 1872, letterbook 3, First National
Bank of Santa Fe Collection, Zimmerman Library, University of New Mexico; Elkins to
Northrup and Chick, September 14, 1872, letterbook 3, First National Bank Collection.
8. Lehman Speigelberg to Comptroller of the Currency, August 23, 1872, and Leh-
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Just over a month earlier, the stockholders of First National had
held a meeting, with Thomas Catron present for the first time, and
declared a 4 percent dividend. Six months later, 7 percent dividends
were paid. At Second National in October 1872 the bank reported
business "steadily increasing" with the "promise of being one hundred
times [better] than we expected." Santa Fe apparently had enough
business for two banks, and by November Willi Speigelberg admitted
to Levi that First National was "a live competitor." He added, "We
have to gain on them step by step-must not allow them an advantage."9
For both banks, a major boon to business graced them when the
Kansas Pacific Railroad in 1871 reached Kit Carson, Colorado, thus
moving Santa Fe some twenty-seven days closer to a railhead. Local
wool business boomed. Loans to sheepmen formed a staple of the
banks' business, and the prospect of the railroad opening New Mexico
markets made each bank optimistic.
Still, banking had problems, not the least of which was a chronic
shortage of change and, at times, silver. Unlike states that boomed
because of mining, such as Colorado and Arizona, New Mexico could
not rely on payment in kind during silver,shortages. If worse came to
worst, at least Colorado bankers could weigh and verify the value of
gold dust and have it serve as a medium of transfer. Throughout the
fall of 1872, a lack of silver plagued First National, and in December
the cashier urged shippers to "hurry up silver fast as possible." But
Second National avoided this shortage becquse it had opened only
recently and still had large reserves, and because a customer who was
expected to place a big draw on the bank's silver left town. By early
November Willi Speigelberg advised Levi that "our gold business [is]
not likely to be very large" and requested that the gold balances be
transferred to the currency account. 10
man Speigelberg to Levi Speigelberg, August 31, 1872, and September 14, 1872, Speigelberg letterbook, Second National Bank of New Mexico Collection, Museum of New
Mexico, Santa Fe, New Mexico. This material was copied by William Parish, Parish
notebook 2, William Parish Papers, Zimmerman Library, University of New Mexico. Willi
Speigelberg to Felipe Chavez, January 20, 1879, Chavez Collection, Zimmerman Library,
University of New Mexico. Also see stockholder list, January 1, 1880, in Chavez Collection.
9. Mauzy, Century (n Santa Fe, 13-14; Willi Speigelberg to Levi Speigelberg, October
17 and November 3, 1872, Speigelberg letterbook, Second National Bank Collection.
10. Willi Speigelberg to Levi Speigelberg, November 6, 1872, December 7, 1872,
letterbook 6, First National Bank Collection; Willi Speigelberg to Schutz!?], November
2, 1872, Willi Speigelberg to Levi Speigelberg, November 2, 1872, and Willi Speigelberg
to J. W. Seligman, November 4, 1872, Second National Bank Collection. No work (of
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New Mexico bankers had few concerns with the use of gold dust,
which constantly beset Colorado (especially Denver) and Arizona bankers. In those states, scales to weigh gold dust were a common feature,
and often bankers sported long, shaggy beards and long hair, both of
which conveniently captured specks of dust stirred up in the weighing
process. At the end of the day, a good combing could net the banker
a few dollars' worth of gold dust. Sweeping up the bank also proved
pleasant and profitable. But New Mexico Territory's financiers did share
many banking practices common throughout the West. Use of a signature book, for example, provided the only effective check on identification. The signature on a note was compared with that in the book.
If the two did not match, the banker refused the endorsed note. Likewise, all deposits and credits, in addition to being entered in the daily
bank journal, were recorded in response to the depositor or creditor,
usually on onionskin paper in the bank's letterpress book, which assured a copy for the bank's files. It is not clear, however, that New
Mexico bankers made widespread use of telegraph codes (a means of
informing other bankers of transactions en route), as did Arizona bankers. ll
Bankers in the land of enchantment also resembled their neighbors
in placing a great deal of emphasis on the appearances of their interior
and exterior facilities. The report on the Albuquerque National Bank
hardly differed from similar news items about Colorado or Arizona
banks: The local paper mentioned the "handsomely paved" floor, the
fixtures, and, of course, the vault ("not a stronger vault in the United
States"). Christopher Nelson, in a perceptive essay, has discussed the
psychology behind bank architecture, noting that in the nineteenth
century, large columns and dignified-looking buildings were the rule.
New Mexico's financial institutions adhered to this pattern whenever
possible.1 2 When it came to lending, Second National carefully kept

which I am aware) has compared the volume or velocity of coin circulating in mining
areas with that of nonmining areas.
11. Because of cost or secrecy or both, fewer words were used when telegraphing
information about transactions, which led to a "shorthand" code. See First National Bank
Collection, for a sample of bankers' materials. On Colorado banking, see Thomas Noel,
Colorado's Oldest Bank: Colorado National Bank, 1862-1987 (Denver: Colorado National Bank
and the University of Colorado at Denver, Colorado Studies Center, 1987). For telegraph
codes, see Schweikart, "'You Count It,''' 355-56.
12. See newspaper report from Albuquerque Morning Democrat, June 26, 1890, box 1,
folder 72, "Business Misc.," Chavez Collection; Christopher Nelson, "Bank Architecture
in the West," Journal of the West, 23 (April 1984), 77-87; Schweikart, Banking in Arizona,
21-36. Compare this report with that of an antebellum Arkansas bank in Arkansas Gazette,
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Proprietors and young passers-by posed outside the Meredith & Ailman Bank
in Silver City, New Mexico, for this photograph, circa 1882. Courtesy Museum
of New Mexico.

Wood, marble, and high ceilings were the order of the day for the {nterior of
the First National Bank of Santa Fe, shown here in a 1913 photograph. Courtesy
Museum of New Mexico.
.
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loans to a maximum of four months. Unlike banks in Arizona and
Colorado, Second National found it more profitable to lend in New
York, "in preference to securities offered here." As with their competitors, good customers also were permitted to overdraw accounts for a
few days.13
Neither the First or Second National Bank expected the panic of
1873. Elkins first noted it in September, when he gave the panic as a
reason for curtailing First National's lending. Afew days later he offered
the view that New Mexico saw the panic as temporary and that the
state would not be affected. When depressed conditions lasted until
November, Elkins assured the stockholders that they would receive
every accommodation, although the bank expected to be short of funds.
Tough times persisted well into the next year, and it remained "next
to impossible to make collections." By November 1874, however, the
bank had only two debts as remnants of the panic. At Second National,
less concern was evident, despite that bank's New York connection.
The prominent businessman, Felipe Chavez of Belen, commented in
January 1874 that Second National's business was much better than
expected. However, the cashiers admitted that money was scarce and
that high interest rates, 1.5 percent to 2 percent per month, could be
expected to continue until April. But more than financial troubles, a
suspension of mail in early January contributed to a "general dullness"
in business. 14
Lending policies brought out the best and the worst in bankers.
First National took as security such unique collateral as a bale of burlap,
and the bank so influenced the market with its occasionally generous
terms that when Lehman Speigelberg urged Second National to levy
extra charges on collections, Willi Speigelberg rejected the idea, arguing
that the Speigelbergs were obliged to give at least the same, if not
superior, inducements to customers as the competition. First National
also accepted joint notes, "to give the surety every opportunity to save
himself from loss.... We have never had a suit and do not want one."
However, First National refused a loan to the Seligman brothers, who
June 19, 1839, and October 30, 1839; and in Schweikart, Banking in the American South,
236.
13. Cashier's letters, November 30, 1872, December 2, 1872, Speigelberg letterbook,
Second National Bank Collection; cashier's letter August 30, 1873, letterbook 7, First
National Bank Collection.
14. Cashier's letters, September 23 and 26, 1873, November 17, 1873, letterbook 7,
June 2, 1874, letterbook 8, November 17, 1874, letterbook 9, First National Bank Collection.
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then withdrew their account. Elkins could "not recommend them as
straight-forward, fair & upright dealers."!5
It is clear from the records that both banks directed their correspondent relationships toward St. Louis, Chicago, and New York, not
westward to San Francisco. Business exchanges with Colorado banks,
even those in Denver, remained light throughout the 1870s. Occasionally, a difference in operations arose, usually resulting in what the First
National cashier saw as an unfair charge, as when the First Pueblo
Bank of Pueblo began charging interest arbitrarily on notes due. But
these exchanges were the exception not the rule. If correspondence
with Colorado banks was infrequent, virtually no business connections
existed with the banks in Tucson or other places in Arizona. !6
Having a national charter prior to 1876 did not guarantee that a
bank would act as the depository of public funds, which later would
prove an important and solid source of deposit funds for many banks.
First National recognized the potential of carrying the U.S. depository
status and in May 1876, the officers of the bank planned to obtain the
deposits after a pending bill passed that would do away with the U.S.
depositories and substitute national banks to handle their functions.
First National's cashier noted that the local depository had averaged
$300,000 in deposits. This represented a lucrative account, given that
First National's deposits in 1892, including government deposits, totaled only $562,000. Still, obtaining this account presented some difficulties. The major hurdle involved making the deposit minimum of
$150,000 in government bonds necessary to meet government requirements. These bonds could not be deposited in installments; rather, the
bank had to show $150,000 worth of government bonds in its portfolio
when it applied for depository status. Acquiring such a large amount
of bonds would have required the bank to call in all of its loans, which
represented an unacceptable alternative. Consequently, the directors
examined the possibility of lending the bank money, and by September
the bank had purchased the necessary bonds. A month later, after
receiving the depository designation, the cashier reported that "public
deposits considerably exceed what we expected to receive."!7
15. Cashier's letters, June 28, 1875, August 11 and 27, 1875, letterbook 10, First
National Bank Collection; Willi Speigelberg to Lehman Speigelberg, November 18, 1872,
Speigelberg letterbook, Second National Bank.
16. First National Bank to First Pueblo Bank, November 3, 14, and 22, 1876, letterbook 13, First National Bank Collection. For an exception, see Stephen Elkins to Lord
and Williams, February 14, 1876, letterbook 11, First National Bank Collection.
17. Cashier's letters, May 26, 1876, June 29, 1876, letterbook 12, September 25,1875,
November 6, 1875, letterbook 13, First National Bank Collection.
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At roughly the same time as First National received its depository
status, a third bank entered operations in New Mexico. Jefferson, Joshua,
and Frederick Raynolds established a private bank in Las Vegas in 1876.
In 1879, they received a charter for the First National Bank of Las Vegas,
capitalized at $50,000. Jefferson Raynolds had worked his way up from
being a clerk at the First National Bank of Canton, Ohio, to bookkeeping
at the Colorado National Bank in Pueblo, Colorado. Raynolds was, indeed, a banker at heart, participating in the founding of four other banks,
including the Central Bank of Albuquerque (1878), and he assisted in the
organization of the First National Bank of Colorado, eventually becoming cashier. Three years after he and his brothers founded the First National Bank of Las Vegas, Jefferson and Joshua established the First
National Bank of EI Paso. Eventually the Albuquerque bank owned by
Raynolds and his brothers merged with the First National Bank of Albuquerque in 1881. In addition to the efforts of Raynolds, banking in this
period boomed because the Kansas Pacific Railroad reached Las Vegas
that year. Still another bank, organized by Frank Chapman, opened in
Las Vegas in June 1876 but floundered. Chapman was shot, and the bank
never got off the ground, triggering a wave of speculation that his
shooting caused the bank's difficulties. Only later was it shown that a
lack of capital prevented the bank's opening. Another institution, the
San Miguel National Bank, also opened that year. 1R
As Ralph Edgel has shown, extending the railroad lines brought
a demand for banks in the towns along the railroad. From 1880 to 1884,
eleven of the twelve banks to open business were located in railroad
towns. Even the established banks, such as First National, looked to
the railroad to "lay the foundation of many new businesses in Santa
Fe, and New Mexico" with the bank's help. Not all bankers were as
optimistic about enhanced economic conditions related to the railroad
as those at First National. Daniel Geary, cashier of the First National
Bank of Albuquerque, wrote to bank director Felipe Chavez that he
gave railroad stocks little attention. But Geary doubted whether the
Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad, "running through a country
so sparsely populated," could pay dividends for very long. He suspected that the St. Louis and San Francisco Railroad would be completed within two years. Although Geary advised that Chavez unload
his railroad stock, he warned that "the price of stocks are [sic] controlled

18. Edge\, Brief History, 6-7; History of New Mexico, 1: 412-16; Las Vegas Gazette, June
17, 1876, September 23, 1876.
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... by circumstances, cliques, combinations with other roads, condition of the money markets of the world, and the designs and wishes
of railroad managers."19
Along with the imminent competition, the sparse populations in
the towns where new banks appeared could hardly support a number
of unit banks prompting one observer to note that "little industry
existed or could be encouraged that would provide a demand for sound
bank loans." But where this may have been true in the smaller areas,
Santa Fe had plenty of business. First National seemed constantly beset
by a full discount and lending line. Loans remained at the maximum
through late 1878. However, having a full discount line often was
accompanied by overdue paper, a trait that prompted an inquiry from
the Comptroller of the Currency. In reply, First National's cashier aptly
described the vicissitudes of the New Mexico economy: "Banking in
New Mexico is surrounded by many ... trails by which banks in the
east are free [especially having as customers sheep growers] who though
perfectly good and solvent and always pay in the end are invariably in
the spring of the year hundreds of miles away with their herds."20
Nevertheless, First National had lending problems even without
disruptions in the economy. Its board of directors' minutes and cashier's letterbooks, especially after Rufus J. Palen assumed his duties as
assistant cashier in late 1878, reveal a concern about lending to directors. In August 1877 the board resolved to make no loans without the assent of at least three directors unless only two were available in Santa Fe.
Almost exactly one year later the board again found itself discussing
lending policy, resolving to make noloans without "good collateral, or
upon not less than one good security." Within a few months the board'
heard an explanation by the cashier, William Griffen, as to a deficit on the
books of almost $4,200, most of the amount derived from notes of Bond,
Bloom, and Loeb. Even earlier, Palen, also a director, seemed determined to tighten lending. In December he refused a voucher for cattle as
collateral, and he warned one security that the bank held nearly $28,000
in bills receivable, "which we consider worthless asidefrom your name."21
Palen's activities between 1870 and 1900 provide an interesting
case study of a "banker"-that is, the person who actually runs the
19. Daniel Geary to Felipe Chavez, October 20, 1882, box 1, file 36, Chavez Collection; cashier's letter, June 15, 1878, letterbook 19, First National Bank Collection.
20. Edge), Brief History, 7; cashier's letters, June 4, 1877, letterbook 14, June 5, 1878,
letterbook 18, First National Bank Collection.
21. "Minutes of the Meetings of the Board of Directors," August 8, 1877, August 1,
1878, February 15,1879, all in Parish notebook 2, Parish Papers; cashier's letter, December
4, 1878, letterbook 20, First National Bank Collection.
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Customers of the First National Bank at the corner of Second and Gold in Albuquerque could leave
their bicycles and horse-drawn buggies in the street while they did business at the bank in 1905.
Courtesy Museum of New Mexico.
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bank, not necessarily the owner-and his tenure with the bank is worth
examining. A friend of Elkins, Palen had worked as an agent for Mutual
Life Insurance Company on a 20 percent commission. Palen came into
employment with an annual salary of $1,800, and he retained this
position for several years after joining the bank, even though he was
willing to dispose of the local agency to anyone by 1882. His mother
owned stock in the bank, and he requested that she transfer stock into
his name, also giving him enough to become a director. On June 11,
1883, he became cashier. 22
Although the bank endured tough times from 1883 to 1894, during
which time Palen ran the bank, he nevertheless displayed impressive
business instincts. His primary goal was to end bank loans to directors,
which led him into direct confrontations with Thomas Catron, one of
the bank's largest borrowers. In 1879 Palen warned that Catron had
outstanding loans (or was a security on loans) of $30,000. Moreover,
Catron had borrowed $25,000 several months earlier from Nunna Raymond, in an attempt to shift his debts. By October 1883, Palen, again
alarmed at Catron's borrowing, mentioned to Elkins that Catron's debts
totaled $150,000. Disgusted, Palen noted that despite Catron's success
in obtaining the $25,000 loan from Raymond, the cashier had "no confidence in [Catron] morally, financially, or otherwise." To a potential
lender inquiring about Catron's commercial standing in 1884, Palen
pointed out both Catron's "large landed interests and ... a large amount
of indebtedness."23
Outstanding loans in such large amounts to debtors who had to
borrow elsewhere to meet their obligations contributed to the decline
in the bank's business after 1883. Palen noted that deposits had fallen
$100,000 by 1884, and his bank stood to lose the national depository
business in 1887. He was unconcerned, arguing that, given the 4 percent premium the bank would have to pay to keep it, better profits
could be made by investing. Still, business continued to slump. Elkins,
Palen's ally, resigned as bank president in 1884. William Griffin succeeded him until his death in 1890, when Pedro Perea took over. Perea
resigned in 1894, and Palen was able to force a reorganization of the
board with new directors "not at all indebted to the bank." Catron, of
22. Material on Palen is found in the R. J. Palen letterbook, cited in Parish notebook
2, cashier's letters, April 17, 1879, April 26, 1882, October 11 and 17, 1883, Parish Papers;
Stephen Elkins to R. J. Palen, August 8, 1878, letterbook 19, First National Bank Collection. Also see cashier's letters of November 20, 1878, and December 4, 1878, letterbook
20, First National Bank Collection.
23. Cashier's letters of November 11, 1879, October 11 and 17, 1883, November 24,
1884, Palen letterbook, Parish notebook 2, Parish Papers.
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course, opposed this reorganization. Despite Palen's wishes and expectations to the contrary, Catron remained vice-president. 24
In addition to the problems of director loans-not common at
Second National-a host of other operational difficulties arose. The
shortage of currency, especially silver, continued into the 1880s. First
National also instituted new policies for packing and shipping gold,
apparently because some shipments came in short. First National had
trouble obtaining bookkeepers, and examinations frequently turned up
items that concerned the Comptroller of the Currency. 25
A host of new banks opened between 1879 and 1900 in New Mexico, with records showing at least forty-six commencing business. Many
of these failed quickly. Of the five banks organized in Silver City between 1880 and 1899, three failed before 1894. In Socorro, six of seven
banks closed before 1900. Even First National faced some difficulties
in the 1890s, missing payment of a dividend in 1894. Frank Bond, the
prominent sheepherder from north of Santa Fe, recalled that during
the Panic of 1893, "banks would not loan a dollar. ... Most of the
merchants had to remit currency for their groceries which they bought
in Colorado, as the wholesale grocery dealers were afraid the banks
would break before the checks would be paid."26
Second National closed before the Panic of 1893, liquidating its
operations on July 17, 1892, without requesting recharter. By that time
only Willi Speigelberg remained in New Mexico. The remainder of the
Speigelberg family had moved to New York to join other family members and their business there. The bank generally had a peaceful, voluntary liquidation, although Felipe Chavez, writing to the Comptroller
of the Currency, thought the institution was "rather slow in making
settlement" with the outside stockholders. Others shared Chavez's feelings, but the vice-president, Eugene Fiske, thought the settlement had
been both fair and prompt. 27
24. Cashier's letters of April 4, 1884, February 22, 1887, December 31, 1888, June
12, 1894, Parish notebook 2, Parish Papers; Mauzy, A Century in Santa Fe, 17.
'25. Cashier's letters, June 6,1877, letterbook 14, June 6 and 29, 1877, letterbook 15,
June 28, 1878, letterbook 19, October 30, 1878, November 19, 1878, letterbook 20, October
3, 1879, letterbook 25, October 20, 1879, letterbook 26, First National Bank Collection.
Despite the scarcity of silver, it was selling at only eighty to eighty-five cents per ounce.
26. Edgel, Brief History, 7; Mauzy, Century in Santa Fe, 17; Frank Grubbs, "Frank
Bond, Gentleman Sheepherder of Northern New Mexico, 1883-1915" (master's thesis,
University of New Mexico, 1958), 18; Frank Bond, "Memoirs of Forty Years in New
Mexico," paper read before the Ten Dons, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
27. Lehman Speigelberg to the Comptroller of the Currency, May 24, 1894, Felipe
Chavez to the Comptroller of the Currency, September 3, 1895, A. J. Preston to Comptroller of the Currency, May 23, 1898, Eugene Fiske to the Comptroller of the Currency,
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While Second National joined nineteen other banks that closed
before 1900, its end was not the result of economic conditions. In fact,
of the nineteen other banks that closed before 1900, nine were in Silver
City or Socorro, whose populations were too small to support them.
Only in Albuquerque, with its 28,000 population, should the commercial support of a bank have been better. Even in the next twenty
years, Albuquerque banks displayed a casualty rate of almost 50 percent. One of these, Albuquerque National Bank, which had opened in
1884 and reorganized in 1887, closed in 1893 while paying its depositors
in full. Stephen Folsom, the president, had made false entries for two
years until he was discovered and indicted. He received a five-year
prison sentence for his activities, although President William McKinley
finally pardoned him. No doubt other "failed" banks had similar extenuating circumstances, but many flopped because, like the Commercial Bank of Deming, run by C. H. Dane, they overextended to
unprofitable enterprises. Dane eventually was indicted for his part in
the collapse of the First National Bank of Silver City.
It is also interesting to note that fully half of the banks in existence
in 1902 had national charters, meaning they received government deposits. In all likelihood, some of these banks would have faced tough
going without the government funds. Still, it should be remembered
that frontier banks were scarcely more than semiregulated small businesses in the nineteenth century, and a failure rate of roughly 40 percent made them relatively more successful than other enterprises. 28
After 1900, New Mexico entered a period of expansion, made
possible by the railroads, which enhanced agriculture by making markets more accessible. Over the next ten years the number of farms
tripled, and "improved" farmland increased by 350 percent. The population grew by almost 70 percent, and employment in manufacturing
leaped almost proportionately. Between 1900 and 1911, seventy-six new
banks began operations. In many cases, the newcomers represented
competitors entering a market where one bank already existed. Most
were founded in agricultural communities with small populations, and
almost all of them closed within twelve years. A variety of trust companies, savings banks, and other financial institutions also dotted the
landscape. 29

January 17, 1905, all in Second National Bank of New Mexico, Records of the Comptroller
of the Currency, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
28. Edgel, Brief History, 7-8; History of New Mexico, 1: 420.
29. Edgel, Brief History, 8; History of New Mexico, 1: 420-35.

18

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

JANUARY 1988

One of the original bills, dated January 16, 1871, with which the First National
Bank of Santa Fe opened its doors. Courtesy Banquest/First National Bank of
Santa Fe.

Despite the boom, New Mexico's economy and its banks fell prey
to exogenous shocks. Another panic struck in 1907-one that forced
banks in neighboring Arizona to resort to an emergency clearinghouse
system or face insolvency. New Mexico banks also found themselves
in trouble. Frank Bond recalled that "the Roosevelt panic," as he called
it, placed him in tight straits. Cattle feeders, who used Bond's lots and
facilities and who had borrowed from small local banks, gave Bond
their checks "(good before the panic) [and] quite a number were turned
down." Bond could only "appeal to our banks for help.... The Major
[R. J. Palen] surely proved a loyal friend ... during this cataclysm.... "
When Bond received word that one of the drafts given to him had
been turned down, he immediately took the train from Espanola to
Santa Fe to see Palen, who told Bond he would "see us through, but
to not use the bank for any more than we had to." The sheepman
rebounded that year with a profit of $100,000. 30
Bond's relationship with Palen and First National had developed
well before the panic and continued well after it. When Bond started
a lumber business in 1903 with C. L. Pollard and Truchas Lumber
Company, Palen advanced $5,000. Bond himself then underwrote the
company for almost $30,000 more over the ensuing months. He relied
on Palen to watch Pollard's activities, but Bond continued to press
Palen to extend notes. Because of the banker's efforts on Bond's behalf,
and because Bond liked to conceal his holdings, he gave Palen a share
30. Grubbs, "Frank Bond," 36.
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of company stock and named him vice-president. As late as 1930, Bond
still approached the bank with innovative financing plans, such as one
that took advantage of economies of scale by offering Bond's feedlots
to others, using the bank to clear the checks. 3l
Given the scope of Bond's activities, it is surprising that he did
not expand into banking. As a private banker of sorts, he considered
moving to chartered banking through a company with his brother, G.
W. Bond & Bro. George Bond thought it worthwhile to acquire stock
in a bank but worried about what examiners might say about loans to
stockholders. Besides, he reasoned, banks paid less return than his
mercantile operations. 32
Even without Bond, eighty-six banks operated in fifty towns by
1912, with more than half located in towns having populations of one
thousand or more. They had resources of $26.2 million, with average
resources of $300,000, although minimum capital requirements at the
time were only $15,000 for state banks and $25,000 for national banks.
A decline in agricultural prices in 1911 triggered a series of bank failures
that saw eleven failures by 1914 and seven voluntary closings. At the
same time, however, fifteen new banks opened, many in towns with
existing banks, generating more competition. 33
First National Bank in Santa Fe remained at the forefront of New
Mexico's banks during this period. Under Palen's leadership the bank
had sought new types of investment in railroad bonds and the notes
of national manufacturers. Among the companies in which First National invested were Hood Rubber Company, Yale & Towne Mfg., Pittsburgh Steel Co., United States Steel, Allis Chalmers Co., Westinghouse
Electric, Swift and Company, and Western Electric. During this period
First National also joined the Federal Reserve System, organized in
1914. 34
More than ever, First National was immersed in its daily operations
under Palen. He was candid, even blunt. Once he advised a client
against holding New Mexico oonds, citing his impression "from over
twenty years residence here that the Community is not one to persist
31. Cashier's letters, March 8, 9, 12, and 15, 1903, December 3, 1903, February 13,
1904, June 8,1904, and August 15,1904, Frank Bond letterbook 6, Frank Bond Collection,
Zimmerman Library, University of New Mexico, all cited in Grubbs, "Frank Bond," 16164; Frank Bond to L. A. Hughes and Arthur Seligman, September 27, 1930, box 113,
First National Bank Collection.
32. Frank Bond letterbook 57, February 9, 1915, Frank Bond Collection, cited in
Grubbs, "Frank Bond," 236.
33. Edge!, Brief History, 10.
34. Mauzy, Century in Santa Fe, 19-20.
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in promptly meeting its obligations." He also found the state "lavish
in taxation for public institutions." It is unlikely that he became rich
with his president's salary. At the Capital City Bank as late as 1922 the
president's salary was only $3,200. Indeed, Palen deliberately weeded
out those, such as Catron, who tried to use the bank for obvious
personal gain. If Palen profited greatly through his position, he at least
did it discreetly.3s
Palen's long service at the bank began to show in his temperament.
Although commodities were still accepted as security (one borrower
secured a $5,000 note with seventy-five steers, fifty-six two-year heifers,
three cows, two bulls, etc.), Palen found collecting more difficult than
ever. One customer, Reginald Cobbett, refused to pay the note of L.
W. Sowards, which Cobbett deposited. Palen admonished Cobbett that
"the merre fact that Sowards failed in any contract he had with you
cuts no figure in your liability to pay it." The president also threatened
suit, a course that the bank had avoided earlier in its history. To another
customer, Palen pointed out that the signature on a note and another
on a mortgage, supposedly by the same customer, did not conform.
The bank, he instructed, could not accept "altogether a too loose system
of doing business." Palen even drifted into personal attacks and rudeness. He wrote to M. W. Mills that it was "somewhat difficult, and not
a little annoying, to deal with parties who are so uncertain and variable." Mills calculated that his note would be due September I, to which
Palen retorted, "You dont [sic] know how to calculate." After showing
that the note would be due on a different date, Palen took a written
slap at Mills by taking "the opportunity to put you through the first
kindergarden [sic] financial course." Toward yet another customer, Palen
became even more personal: "I have reliable reports that you are drinking rather heavily and that it has gotten you into some domestic difficulties." Still, Palen never lost sight of making his existing customers
happy and attracting new ones. When the note of the Rio Grande Live
Stock Company fell due, the bank extended it, and Palen noted, "Inasmuch as your company is a large borrower from this bank-now to
the amount of $9500 ... it would not be at all out of harmony with
the everlasting fitness of things if you kept your bank account with
us.... You know a bank is under greater obligations to its regular
customers than to an outsider ... and when tight times come it is the
outsider who is first called on to pay." Palen stepped down in 1916,
35. Cashier's letters, May 6, 1895, R. J. Palen letterbook, January 3, 1922, Capital
City Bank directors' minutebook, both in First National Bank Collection.
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replaced by Levi A. Hughes, a marketing and livestock management
expert. His retirement was fitting, as banking in the state had entered
another era. 36
New competition entered the market in 1910, with the Capital City
Bank and Santa Fe Bank both established that year. The former institution ran into trouble at the outset, and by 1918 the directors admitted
that "new business must have much attention." Nevertheless, by December 1918 the bank declared a 6 percent dividend, and for the first
six months of 1919 it reported net earnings of $4,000. A distressing
trend had developed, though. Repeatedly, examiners expressed concern about excess loans and overdrafts, but gross profits for 1921 were
$21,207 (net, $5,581). For the following year gross profits increased by
only $800. The national agricultural depression hit New Mexico, and
undiversified banks were vulnerable. In December 1922 the directors,
responding to a November examination, considered the examiner's
suggestion that in "view of certain losses and others which might be
sustained ... an assessment be considered [of 40-50 percent] to be
placed in a stockholders account." Two weeks later, the board conceded. 37
Or had it? By April 1923 the assessment was postponed, and the
board generally ignored its problems. The bank's weakness, however,
was clear enough. On May 28, 1923, the bank officially closed. Conditions were confronted frankly, with the board finding it advisable to
effect a consolidation with the Santa Fe Bank if possible. Discussions
with the Santa Fe Bank followed, and the Capital City officers submitted
a: plan. Santa Fe Bank apparently disliked what it saw, for on June 2 a
special meeting of the directors was called to avoid liquidation. R. L.
Ormsbee, the cashier, received a letter two days later that referred "to
the possibility of outside interests coming in on a reorganization of the
business of Capitol [sic] City." It was too late. The bank had,passed
into receivership by the end of the year. In fall 1924, the Farmers State
Bank of Moriarity closed. First National Bank engaged in extensive
purchases of mortgages and notes of the failed bank. These were only
36. R.J. Palen to J. W. Ford, August 28, 1914, R. J. Palen to H. S. Arnold, May 27,
1914, R. J. Palen to Hadlock & Brown, April 29, 1914, R. J. Palen to M. W. Mills, July 3,
1914, R. J. Palen to T. J. Sawyer, June 3, 1914, R. J. Palen to A. L. Thomas, April 28,
1914, and R. J. Palen to Oscar Snow, May 6, 1914, transfer files, general correspondence,
First National Bank Collection.
37. Entries of March [l ?), 1918, December 31, 1918, June 30, 1919, June 30, 1921,
June 30,1922, December 26,1922, Capital City Bank directors' minutebook, First National
Bank Collection.
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two of fifty-four New Mexico banks that failed between 1920 and 1926,
and twenty-five others either closed voluntarily or merged. 38
Despite being able to make acquisitions or mortgage purchases
such as with the Farmers State Bank, the leaders of the First National
Bank realized that their institution prospered in the midst of hardship.
In the annual message to the stockholders in 1923, the president noted
that "banking and financial conditions in New Mexico during the past
year have been exceedingly and unusually bad." First National itself
experienced "heavy losses in the livestock industry during 1921 and
1922." Individuals continued to request information on New Mexico's
economic potential in the depths of the depression, but the bank could
not be optimistic. 39
The"deluge" of failed banks followed a period of sharp expansion
in New Mexico's economy and in agricultural prices in particular. Beef
cattle prices in New Mexico rose by $3.50 per hundredweight and lamb
prices rose almost $10 per hundredweight during the first three years
of World War I. Wool prices advanced almost proportionately; wheat
prices more than doubled. Just as agriculture prospered, so did the
metals industry. Copper, silver, lead, and zinc all saw sharp upward
curves in prices. New Mexico mines responded with increased output,
and farmers expanded production in keeping with market incentives.
Nevertheless, both industries felt the postwar depression acutely, and
their distress affected the state's banks. 4O
Yet, it is important to keep New Mexico's banking experience
during the 1920s in perspective. "Overbanking"-that is, a low population-to-bank-office density ratio-was characteristic of neighbol'ing
Arizona as well, where from 1900 to 1924 the average population per
banking office dropped by over two thousand-almost 50 percent. Runs.
struck Arizona banks in Metcalf, Jerome, the Central Bank of Phoenix,
the Central Bank of Wickenburg, the Exchange Bank of Peoria, and the
Citizens Bank of Five Points in 1921 and 1922. By 1932 as many as
forty-four banks had failed or voluntarily liquidated in Arizona. 41
Neither did the experiences of New Mexico and Arizona differ
38. Ibid., entries of April 10, 1923, June 4, 1923, Capitol City Bank directors' minutebook, box 17, "Moriarity Note/Correspondence," and box 9, folder "M," First National
Bank Collection; Edgel, Brief History, 11-12.
39. "To the Stockholders," January 9, 1923, box 9, "Santa Fe Mining Company"
folder, John Henry to First National Bank, August 14, 1923, box 9, "Han-Har" folder,
and L. A. Hughes to John Henry, August 1, 1923, First National Bank Collection.
40. Edgel, Brief History, 10-12.
41. The exact numbers of banks closed are disputed, Schweikart, Banking in Arizona,
65-70, 203-6.
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much between 1926 and 1930. Arizona's banking ranks continued to
thin out, with six banks closing in that period and four more within
the next two years. New Mexico witnessed six liquidations or failures
and four absorptions by merger or purchase. Thus, both states witnessed a net decline in total number of banks during the "Roaring
Twenties" that weeded out many weak institutions in rural areas. Although the worst was over, more failures occurred during the Great
Depression. 42
New Mexico, nevertheless, responded with some legislative changes,
mostly designed to patch up holes in the 1915 banking law. These
revisions sought to bolster the capital floor to at least $25,000 under
which banks (and other businesses) operated; to raise surplus bank
funds to 50 percent of capital stock; to restrict lending of deposits to
companies paying a 4 percent dividend over the previous five years;
to protect the state's deposits in insolvent banks; to improve financial
reports to state bank examiners; to change composition of boards of
directors to local members and to require boards to meet (perhaps not
motivated by the escapades of Maxwell's early group, but certainly
fitting); to establish ceilings on the cost of bank buildings, fixtures, and
furniture; to prohibit loans that would put a bank below the capital
"floor"; and to limit loans to one person or corporation to a percentage
of capital stock. 43 ·
That same year, 1929, anew bank collection code expedited and
simplified collection and payment of checks. Since it defined banking
as any "person, firm, or corporation engaged in the business of receiving and paying deposits of money in the state," it allowed easier
collection by agents other than banks as defined by banking laws. The
law also placed more responsibility on the maker of a check for its
eventual redemption. 44
By the 1930s, the financial institutions of New Mexico had
strengthened themselves. Laws had been revised after the shakeout
of the 1920s that prevented drastic changes in the banking structure
during the Depression. A changing financial landscape had characterized the first sixty years of banking in New Mexico, with dozens of
banks coming and going. Bankers had grudgingly given up on the idea
that an economy based on a single sector-mining, agriculture, or
livestock--could guarantee success in banking, even if that sedor grew
at consistent rates. A number of important__ personalities, including
42. Ibid., 65-70; Edge!, Brief History, 13-14.
43. See New Mexico Laws, chap. 131, 1929, sec. 5-12, 62-63.
44. Ibid., chap. 138, 1929, sec. 1-13.
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Maxwell, the Speigelbergs,· Palen, Catron, and the Raynolds brothers,
had all left their marks on New Mexico banking. Certainly not every
one of these men demonstrated the skills of a great banker, and perhaps
only a few did. Yet even exceptional bankers would have experienced
difficulty in trying to force-feed banking growth in New Mexico. The
antibranching emphasis and the pockets of economic monoculture had
erected a hurdle so high that only the best bankers could clear it consistently.

